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Abstract
This paper re-examines the content of a standard advanced course
in Cybersecurity from the perspective of Cloud Computing. More
precisely, we review the core concepts of Cybersecurity, as presented
in a senior undergraduate or graduate class, in light of the Amazon
Web Services (AWS) cloud.
1 Introduction
This paper has three goals: (i) to aid faculty in cloudifying a Cybersecurity
offering; (ii) to re-examine Cybersecurity in light of the new paradigm of
Cloud Computing; and, (iii) as a guide for preparing for the AWS Security
Specialty certification ([1]). The paper presents an outline of Cybersecurity,
with topics examined in the context of AWS, and with a long bibliography for
a more in-depth study of each topic. For a more general guide to cloudifying
a Computer Science curriculum see [2].
Cybersecurity is generally understood to be a set of techniques and mea-
sures taken to protect digital information against unauthorized access or at-
tack. Like all of Computer Science, it is a new field; the first use of the term
is recent: 1989. Cybersecurity is also known simply as Security, Computer
Security and Information Security. The prefix cyber comes from the word
cybernetics, which is the science of communication and control. Cybernetics
was imported into English in the 1940s, from the Greek word: κυβρνητηζ,
∗California State University Channel Islands, Professor in the Department of Computer
Science, URL: www.msoltys.com, Email: michael.soltys@csuci.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
12
90
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 M
ar 
20
20
kuberne¯te¯s, which means steersman. Of course, kuberne¯te¯s now also gave rise
to Kubernetes [3], an open-source container coordination system.
It is difficult to give a precise definition to Cybersecurity, partly because it
has become such a vast field. Richard Bejtlich defines security as the process
of maintaining an acceptable level of perceived risk for a specified event [4].
Cybersecurity is the application of this principle to IT. There is no perfect
security, as Gene Spafford famously stated: The only truly secure system is
one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete, and sealed in a lead-lined
room with armed guards—and even then, I have my doubts. [5]
Bruce Schneier makes the point regarding the security ROI that: Security
is not an investment that provides a return, like a new factory or a financial
instrument. It’s an expense that, hopefully, pays for itself in cost savings.
Security is about loss prevention, not about earnings [6].
Schneier’s quote points to a tension that practitioners experience in the
workplace: their advice regarding security expenditures is frequently not
heeded, and they are dismissed as prophets of “doom and gloom.” When
nothing bad happens they are forgotten, and when breaches do occur they
are blamed. Many decision makers seem to be comfortable living with the
possibility of a breach tomorrow rather than spending today precious com-
pany resources (see [7]).
AWS is conducive to the design of applications with security built in
from the beginning, not to mention a plethora of monitoring services such as
CloudWatch, CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Inspector, WAF, Shield,
Athena, Macie, and others, disscussed in this paper.
1.1 Approaches to Cybersecurity
In this paper we are going to examine cybersecurity in the context of Cloud
Computing, but there are many other ways to focus on this vast subject. In
this section we list some of those other approaches.
As a Software Engineer: concentrating on how to write programs
correctly and defensively, e.g., avoid SQL injections or buffer overflows. Ed
Amoroso (Networks Security, AT&T) writes:
Software is most of the problem. We have to find a way to write
software which has many fewer errors and which is more secure.
[8, pg. 272]
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There are two, unfortunately inadequate, approaches to software correctness:
testing and formal methods; see [9]. Typical development techniques that
have been shown to be effective are code minimization, formal development
methods1, and using type-safe languages. The point here is to make security
a “built-in” rather than an “add-on”; see [19].
As an IT expert / system administrator: install patches and anti-
malware applications, limit phishing attacks in your domain, backups and
system availability, etc.
As a cryptographer / cryptoanalyst: design and analyze crypto-
graphic schemes (e.g., elliptic curve crypto) study issues of implementation
(e.g., OpenSSL libraries) and protocols (e.g., variants of Kerberos).
As a business: audits of compliance, risk assessment; ultimately, Cy-
bersecurity is a business decision, not an IT decision. To see this note that
IT could simply decide to encrypt everyone’s data with a secret key — this
would keep the data safe but useless from the business perspective of the
endeavor. Here is a great quote from AWS:
Security is the ability to protect information, systems and assets,
while delivering business value through risk assessment and threat
mitigation [20].
As an educator: for example, teach basic practices for the average user
to be protected as much as possible. It is important to educate the public
in the understanding that security and convenience are orthogonal goals, in
the sense that more security usually implies less convenience; this can come
as a surprise to many2: here is a quote from the interesting article [22]:
1The problem of “how to write correct software” has not been solved, and it is one of
the main open problems of Computer Science (see introduction to [10]). Dave Parnas ([11])
is a Software Engineer who has thought at length about this problem, and has written on
it extensively: [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Parnas and Soltys co-authored the paper [17] on the
importance of mathematics for Software Design. There are techniques to improve software
quality, but no general methodology exists as in more established areas of engineering. One
thing that Parnas promoted strongly throughout his career was the importance of writing
good documentation; one of the reasons the author became fascinated by AWS was its
culture of documenting its services; as [18] writes on page xxvii, writing is deeply ingrained
in our [AWS] culture and decision-making process.
2See here for typical event for small businesses [21]. Small businesses, which often
cannot afford an IT department, are especially vulnerable; 70% go under following a
(successful) Ransomware attack.
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There is an inherent paradox to covert communications systems,
one of the former officials said: The easier a system is to use,
the less secure it is.
As a Cyber-warrior or law-enforcement: defend cyber-infrastructure,
and probe and penetrate the cyber-infrastructure of other countries (or orga-
nizations), all done within an organized and legal framework. Or, in the area
of digital forensics, where our Computer Science department at California
State University Channel Islands has a thriving partnership [23].
As a policy wonk: which policies and regulations need to be in place;
what is the extent of the reach of law in digital forensics? What international
conventions ought to govern cyberwarfare? See [8, 24].
As a cyber-vandal or criminal: proving something that everybody
already knows: that destroying and breaking is always easier than building
and constructing.
2 Cybersecurity core curriculum
2.1 Objectives of Cybersecurity
In this section we list the classical objectives of Cybersecurity. We briefly
discuss the measures, techniques and procedures that are usually deployed
to meet those objectives.
1. Confidentiality: in order to prevent the disclosure of information
to unauthorized entities (people or systems). It is usually achieved
through data encryption, either with symmetric or asymmetric (i.e.,
public key) algorithms. AWS has tools for managing both keys and
certificates: the Key Management Service (KMS) manages keys for
both symmetric and asymmetric encryption [25]. On the other hand,
Certificate manages certificates [26] — for example, certificate for
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) connections with DB instances running the
MariaDB engine ([27]).
2. Integrity: data cannot be modified undetectably. An example where
data integrity is essential is in inter-bank money transfers; changing the
amount in transit would be even more damaging to the banking system
than disclosing the amount — of course, we can have both integrity
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and confidentiality. Another measure for integrity is digital signatures
(also known as digital digests) which both authenticate a document
and ensure its integrity. This is achieved with hashing functions and
public key cryptography. “Adobe Sign” (which, as all of Adobe, is
built on AWS [28]) is an example of a technology implementing digital
signatures.
3. Availability: information is available when it is needed, that is, both
the computer system, and the communication channels are function-
ing correctly. A typical attack against availability is the (distributed)
denial-of-service attack (DDoS) [29], but of course not all attacks against
availability are malicious; Werner Vogel3: Everything fails all the time.
Best practice for availability is to design fault tolerant and loosely cou-
pled systems. AWS provides mechanisms for designing such system
with, for example, AutoScaling ([30]) which is a service that, when
deployed, grows and shrinks the number of EC2 instances assigned to
a task according to demand, and LoadBalancing ([31]) which is a
service that distributes tasks among a fleet of EC2 instances. Two
other important concepts associated with availability are Multi Avail-
ability Zone Deployment, and Content Distribution Networks (CDN)
which are implemented at edge locations with CloudFront, which is
essentially a giant caching service. [32].
We abbreviate the foundational triad of Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability as CIA. The CIA objectives are often supplemented by the fol-
lowing “three A’s” objectives:
4. Authentication: to ensure that data, transactions, communications
or documents are genuine; a typical example of authentication is a
login/password pair, often supplemented with Multi-Factor Authenti-
cation (MFA), to verify the user of a system. An authentication scheme
purports to validate that the parties involved are who they claim to be,
but technically only verifies that the agent attempting to gain permis-
sion is in possession of the credentials — this could be by legitimate
ownership, or by stealing them, guessing them, or generating them by
a brute-force search if the credentials were short strings or dictionary
words.
3Werner Vogel is Vice President & Chief Technology Officer at Amazon.com
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AWS has a powerful service for authentication: Identity Access Man-
agement (IAM) ([33]), which coordinates access through: users, groups,
roles and policies. AWS also provides Active Directory ([34]) and
SAML ([35]) for authentication.
5. Authorization: once an agent is authenticated, where the ‘agent’ can
be a human user or a machine process, authorization stipulates what
this agent is allowed to do. This is usually done through a policy, e.g.,
an AWS S3 policy which stipulates whether the agent has read access
to a given S3 bucket ([36]). The guiding principle of authorization is:
the Principle of Least Privilege: give every agent the minimal
amount of permissions that are required to get the job done.
Fans of spy thrillers will recognize this as the “need to know” principle.
In AWS, both authentication and authorization are implemented with
the Identity Access Management (IAM) service discussed in “Authen-
tication” above.
6. Accounting: Keeping record logs, and automating parsing them and
reacting in near real-time. Related AWS services are as follows:
(a) CloudTrail ([37]), which keeps track of all API calls, and logs
them in an S3 bucket;
(b) CloudWatch ([38]), which monitors service usage, and is per-
haps one of the most used tools in the AWS arsenal;
Figure 1: A CloudWatch metric that shows bytes written to an Elastic
Block Store (EBS) over a period of 3 hours.
6
(c) GuardDuty ([39]), which is a continuous monitoring service that
analyzes and processes the following data sources: Virtual Private
Cloud (VPC) flow logs, CloudTrail and DNS logs.
(d) Inspector ([40]), which tests the network accessibility of EC2
instances and the security state of applications that run on those
instances. Inspector assesses applications for exposure, vulnera-
bilities, and deviations from best practices. After performing an
assessment, Inspector produces a detailed list of security findings
that is organized by level of severity.
(e) Macie ([41]) and Athena ([42]) which uses machine learning to
discover and classify sensitive data in S3, and an interactive query
service that makes it easy to analyze data directly in S3 using
SQL queries, respectively.
Finally, to CIA + AAA we add:
7. Non-repudiation: implies that one party of a transaction cannot deny
having received a transaction nor can the other party deny having sent
a transaction; an example of application would be online bidding. Note
that non-repudiation can also be seen under Accounting.
We achieve some of the eight objectives through cryptography, but not all.
For example, SecurityGroups (outside the cloud known as firewalls), filter
network traffic ([43]), and LoadBalancing, which help in the scaling of
demand and discussed in the section on “Availability,” are not cryptographic
applications.
2.2 Examples of basic attacks
2.2.1 Phishing
Phishing is a social engineering attack that aims at the weakest link of any
computer system: the human user. Phishing attacks have become extremely
sophisticated over the years. They range from SPAM emails, to targeted
attacks (e.g., whaling, which are emails aimed at high profile targets such
as CFOs of a company) where the perpetrators study their victim, some-
times for months, before crafting a precisely targeted phishing email. See for
example [44].
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Although not technically phishing, there are many varieties of online fraud
that are similar to phishing. For example trolling [45], where users — often
state actors — post inflammatory and digressive material, identity theft, cy-
berbullying, evil twin attacks where users — again, often state actors — im-
personate people and companies, frequently for financial gain or defamation.
Online fraud is big business: [46].
2.2.2 DDoS
Distributed Denial of Service, DDoS, was briefly reviewed in Section 2.1,
under “Availability,” where we mentioned the excellent AWS whitepaper on
the subject [29]. AWS customers have three tools at their disposal for DDoS
mitigation:
1. Route53, which is a DNS service [47].
2. CloudFront, which is a Content Distribution Network, discussed in
Section 2.1 under “Availability.”
3. Shield, which protects against DDoS attacks, but costs $3K/month,
and so it is more of an enterprise solution than a private customer
solution. See the AWS whitepaper on DDoS resiliency ([29]) and the
AWS developer guide on Shield itself ([48]).
Note that all three tools work with Edge Locations, which are physical data
centers located in key cities; edge locations work as giant caches4. AWS
has an actual caching tool for accelerating applications, ElastiCache [50].
It supports two open-sourced in-memory caching engines: Memcached and
Redis.
An advantage of edge locations is that threats can be mitigated there
rather than on the server hosting a particular application. This puts, as it
were, distance between the problem and the application.
4The Amazon Builder’s Library ([49]) is a magnificent source of information on the
design of AWS services; information that is well beyond the scope of the AWS Security
certificaton. But, reading the writeups from the Builder’s Library it becomes apparent
that latency is the biggest issue in the Cloud, and that caching is the prevalent solution
to that problem. Caching has a beautiful algorithmic theory, based on Online Algorithms,
that is worth knowing to have more insight into the AWS cloud. For example, the reader
is directed to §5.2, Paging, in [10].
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2.2.3 SQL injection
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [51] is a nonprofit
foundation that works to improve the security of software. OWASP publishes
a ranking of the 10 most-critical web application security flaws, which are
known as the “OWASP Top 10.” It is not surprising that “injection attacks”
are currently in the number one spot on that list.
AWS’s WAF, Web Application Firewall ([52]), helps to defend a website
against the attacks listed by OWASP. It is important to note that WAF does
not help mitigating DDoS; Shield, discussed in the previous section, along
with CloudFront and Route53, are used to defend against DDoS.
2.2.4 Malware
In the popular imagination, cybersecurity is about malware, in its various
forms: Viruses, which modify legitimate host files in such a way that when
the file is executed, the virus is also executed. Worms, which self-replicate
across a network, without end-user action (unlike Viruses, which require that
an end-user “click on it”). Trojans, which have replaced worms and which
masquerade as legitimate programs. Ransomware, which implements digital
extortion by demanding a ransom pay for decrypting the user’s files.
Malware is frequently imported into a user’s computer by a phishing
scam, and sophisticated instances deploy zero-day exploits in order to esca-
late privileges in the Operating System. A zero-day exploit is a software
vulnerability for which no patch has been released yet (zero days since the
release of a patch). Zero-day exploits can still be effective after the patch has
been released if it has not been installed by the system administrator. The
vulnerability exploited by the zero-day can be used to gain privileges in the
Operating System.
There is also Adware and Spyware, with eponymous functionality.
Case Study – Stuxnet: See [53, 54, 55]. Stuxnet was a sophisticated
worm, developed by the US and Israeli governments ([56]) around 2005, code
name “Olympic Games”, aimed at the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz
(Iran), and discovered by the Infosec community around 2010. The worm at-
tacked Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) manufactured by the German
company Siemens, used at the Natanz facility to run centrifuges. Stuxnet
is considered to be the first deployment of a cyberweapon agains IoT. AWS
has a comprehensive offering in the security of IoT [57].
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Case Study – Heartbleed: Heartbeat is an extension protocol for the
Transport Layer Security (TLS), which works as an acknowledgment mech-
anism, which is a way to verify that a server is up, i.e., whether it has a
“heartbeat”. The protocol sends a 40Kb message, and asks for it to be re-
peated back; the receiver of the message allocates a memory buffer, stores the
data, reads the data, and sends it back. The OpenSSL library was shipped
with heartbeat support enabled (March 2012). There was a buffer overflow
vulnerability in the protocol that was not discovered until April 2014.
Case Study – Olympic Destroyer: For this case study see [58]. The
Olympic Destroyer was a worm targetted at the Pyeongchang, South Korea,
Winter Olymbic games of 2018. The well crafted worm brought down the IT
infrastructure of the games. This case study is a great example of the problem
of attribution, i.e., where does the attack originate and who is responsible.
Case Study – Sandworm: See [59]. Sandworm is not malware per
se, but rather a group of state-sponsored hackers, according to experts. For
example, they are believed to have planted malware inside the US electric
utilities in 2014. The citation for this case study is a book which relates
malware to geopolitical issues. It also reads as a great thriller, with vivid
descriptions of the people involved in the drama, as well as cryptic references
to the movie Dune.
Finally, in order to understand the potential for mischief, it is good to
start by reading the seminal paper [60]. A free malware tool can be accessed
at [61].
2.3 Cryptography
Shafi Goldwasser (MIT) defines Cryptography as the art of computing and
communicating in the presence of an adversary [62], and Oded Goldreich
writes that Cryptography is concerned with the conceptualization, definition,
and construction of computing systems that address security concerns [63].
For the sake of this paper, Cryptography is a set of mathematical tools,
which, when implemented as computer programs, help us achieve some of
the security objectives listed in Section 2.1.
While AWS Security Specialty certification does not require an in-depth
understanding of cryptographic protocols (aka, cryptoschemes and cryptosys-
tems), they are nevertheless foundational and required for anyone who wants
to work in the field of security.
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2.3.1 Basic concepts
The three common services of cryptography are the following:
1. Encryption/Decryption: basic service of cryptography, that enables
the sending of data between participants in a way that prevents others
from reading it:
plaintext
encryption−→ ciphertext decryption−→ plaintext
ATTACKATDAWN
encryption−→ HAAHJRHAKHDU decryption−→ ATTACKATDAWN
where the example uses the Caesar cipher with key k = 7.
2. Integrity checking: reassuring the recipient of a message that the
message has not been altered since it was generated by a (legitimate)
source.
3. Authentication: verifying someone’s (something’s) identity; i.e., mak-
ing sure that the source is legitimate and is who they claim to be.
Note the parallel to CIA and AAA listed in Section 2.1: clearly encryp-
tion/decryption serve confidentiality; integrity checking obviously ensures
integrity; and, authentication is the first ‘A’ in ‘AAA.’
Cryptographers invent protocols; cryptoanalysts attempt to break them.
A cryptographic system consists of an algorithm and a secret value, aka, a
key. It is like a combination lock; everybody knows how it works, but you
will not open it without a key. The security of a cryptoscheme depends on
how much work a “bad guy” needs to do to break it.
We consider a cryptoscheme secure if there does not exist a way for finding
a key that is substantially better than a brute force search for a working key.
With that in mind, the following are all equivalent: (i) it is possible to do
secure sessions; (ii) there exist pseudo-random generators; (iii) there exist
“one-way functions”; (iv) there exist secure digital signature schemes. This
equivalence is known as the Fundamental Theorem of Cryptography [64].
Note that we have excellent candidates for each of the above, but we lack a
proof in each case! This is a fundamental gap in the scientific understanding
of cryptography, and a fundamental open problem of Computer Science. The
above also suggests that in practice a good source of pseudo-randomness is
necessary in order to achieve security. In particular, the key ought to be
randomly chosen.
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In light of the lack of a proof that any particular cryptosystem (except
the one-time pad) is secure, we use the following working definition of secu-
rity: lots of smart people have been trying to figure out how to break X,
but so far they have not been able to come up with anything yet. There-
fore X is considered “secure”. This is known as the Fundamental Tenet of
cryptography.
Finally, the Fundamental Assumption of cryptography is that security
does not rely on obscurity (where it often does in Cybersecurity). What this
means is that it is always assumed that everyone knows how a particular
cryptoscheme works (i.e., it is “open source”), that is the algorithm is public
knowledge. The secret is the key. So in principle any cryptoscheme can al-
ways be broken, by, say, brute-force search, but in practice it is too much work
for the “bad guy.” There are three classical attacks against cryptoschemes,
that is, approaches to finding out the plaintext and key:
1. Ciphertext only: The attacker has only the ciphertext, and has to
compute the plaintext and key from it.
2. Known plaintext: The attacker has both the ciphertext and the
corresponding plaintext, and has to compute the key from it.
3. Chosen plaintext: The attacker can choose any plaintext, and get
the corresponding ciphertext, and has to compute the key from it.
A good cryptosystem should resist all 3 attacks.
2.4 Symmetric encryption
In symmetric encryption the same secret key is used for both encryption and
decryption. A widespread symmetric function is the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) cryptographic scheme; AES with secret keys of size 256 is the
de facto standard for symmetric encryption at AWS [65]: fAES : X×Y −→ Z,
where X ∈ {0, 1}k is the key where k ∈ {128, 192, 256}, and Y, Z ∈ {0, 1}128,
where Y is the plaintext block and Z is the ciphertext block. See §3.5 in [66]
for an excellent description of fAES.
It is important to keep in mind that there are two equally important
layers in cryptography, both in symmetric and asymmetric. The first layer
is the mathematical presentation of a cryptographic function, such as fAES.
The second layer is the programmatic implementation of fAES. For exam-
ple, OpenSSL ([67]) implements the most common cryptographic functions
12
(type openssl list-cipher-commands to see which). We can encrypt a file
plaintext with OpenSSL using AES as follows:
openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pass pass:password -p -in plaintext
Note that -aes-256-cbc means that we used AES with a key of size 256
(largest possible), and we used Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) (§4.2.2 in [66])
to encrypt files that have more than 128 bits. The -p switch means that the
salt and the initial vector (iv) and the key resulting from the password are
output as well. The salt and iv are not part of fAES, but they are part of
the implementation in order to guard against “batch attacks” (see pg. 243
in [66]). The salt in the implementation illustrates well the difference between
the mathematical function fAES and its implementation in OpenSSL. From
the point of view of practitioners of Cybersecurity, the implementation is at
least as important as the mathematics defining fAES.
As mentioned in Section 2.2.4, it was an implementation vulnerability in
OpenSSL that lead to Heartbleed. Thus, it is important not to confuse the
mathematical strength, however defined, of a cryptographic function with the
security offered by the implementation of that function. The implementation
may be problematic (we come back to the issue of buggy software described
in Section 1.1), or the implementation may be correct but the deployment of
the application may be faulty.
The point that we belabored here is that cryptographic benefits do not
translate automatically to security benefits.
2.5 Asymmetric, aka Public Key, encryption
A Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) consists of three sets: K, the set of pairs of
keys, M , the set of plaintext messages, and C, the set of ciphertext messages.
A pair of keys in K is k = (kpriv, kpub); the private key and the public key,
respectively. For each kpub there is a corresponding encryption function ekpub :
M −→ C and for each kpriv there is a corresponding decryption function
dkpriv : C −→M .
The property that the encryption and decryption functions must satisfy
is that if k = (kpriv, kpub) ∈ K, then dkpriv(ekpub(m)) = m for all m ∈ M .
The necessary assumption is that it must be difficult to compute dkpriv(c)
just from knowing kpub and c. But, with the additional trapdoor information
kpriv, it becomes easy to compute dkpriv(c).
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The three classical PKCs are: Diffie-Hellman, which is not really a PKC
but rather a way of agreeing on a secret key over an insecure channel, as
well as ElGamal and RSA. All three require large primes (in practice at
least 2,000 bit long); a single prime for Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal, and a
pair of primes for RSA. Those large primes are usually computed using the
Rabin-Miller algorithm — see §6.4 in [10].
An example of PKC in AWS is the generation of a key pair when launching
an EC2 instance [68]. The keys that EC2 uses are 2048-bit SSH-2 RSA keys.
3 AWS best practices
The AWS Well-Architected Framework [69] proposes five pillars for the design
of cloud infrastructure:
1. Operational Excellence
2. Security
3. Reliability
4. Performance Efficiency
5. Cost Optimization
We are going to focus on the security pillar [20].
Although in theory an “on-premises solution” can achieve the same level
of security as a “cloud solution,” in practice bespoke security solutions suffer
from three common shortcomings:
1. the preponderance on manual processes, rather than automated solu-
tions, e.g., IT visually inspects logs at the end of the day;
2. eggshell security models, where the defense is at the perimeter, and
once that is breached, e.g., a password is stolen, the intruders have the
keys to the realm;
3. insufficient auditing, e.g., are those logs really examined, and what is
being logged in the first place?
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On the other hand, the homogeneity of the cloud, e.g., all API calls are
recorded by AWS CloudTrail ([37]), and the existence of tools to automate
response, allow for much better security5. AWS proposes the following design
principles to strengthen security in the cloud (see page 2 of [20]):
1. Implement a strong identity foundation, using the principle of least
privilege (discussed in Section 2.1), enforce separation of duties, and re-
quire appropriate authorization for all interactions with AWS resources.
2. Enable traceability, with monitoring, alert and audit actions, and change
to the environment in real time. Here is where the strength of the cloud
comes to the fore. Also, integrate logs and metric with systems to au-
tomatically respond and take action.
3. Apply security to all layers, rather than security only at the outer
layer; that is, apply what is called defense-in-depth with other security
controls.
4. Automate security best practices, so that with software-based security
mechanism it is possible to securely scale more rapidly and cost effec-
tively. Implement controls that are defined and managed as code in
version controlled templates.
5. Protect data in transit and at rest.
6. Enforce the principle of least privilege, by giving access to data only to
those agents who really need the access. An approach to implementing
this is to start by denying access to everything and allowing access as
the need arises.
7. Prepare for security events, by having an incident management process
aligned to the organizational requirements.
The above should be seen in the context of the AWS Shared Responsibility
Model ([70]), where AWS is responsible for protecting its global infrastructure
5The “homogeneity of the cloud” may be a double-edged sword: yes, it is easier to
prepare defenses for attacks on a uniform platform, but attackers can also take advantage
of the uniformity in deploying the same attacks against multiple targets, where they would
have to adjust their approach if the targets were on very different platforms. Here is an
interesting question; can the cloud infrastructure be “salted” in some sense to avoid batch
attacks?
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(security of the cloud), and the customers are responsible for securing the
resources that they create (security in the cloud). All the AWS compliance
programs can be seen in [71].
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5 Appendix
This section contains a summary of all the AWS services mentioned in this
paper.
AWS Service Short description Pg Cite
Athena S3 data analysis with SQL queries 7 [42]
AutoScaling Grows and shrinks the number of EC2s 5 [30]
Certificate Manages SSL/TLS certificates 4 [26]
CloudFront A caching mechanism at edge locations 5 [32]
CloudTrail Keeps track fo all API calls 6 [37]
CloudWatch Monitors services usage 6 [38]
ElastiCache A caching service 8 [50]
GuardDuty Monitors logs of VPC, CloudTrail, DNS 7 [39]
Inspector Network accessibility of EC2 7 [40]
KMS Manages encryption keys 4 [25]
LoadBalancing Distributes tasks among EC2s 5 [31]
Macie Machine Learning discovery of sensitive data in S3 7 [41]
Route53 DNS service 8 [47]
SecurityGroups Virtual firewall at the EC2 layer 7 [43]
Shield Protects agains DDoS attacks 8 [48]
WAF A web application firewall 9 [52]
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